![]() ![]() Larry Fink, chairman and CEO of BlackRock. Two years ago financial advisor rating firm Paladin Research &. That’s why Jim Fink flips options on its head, allowing him to make For a limited time, he’s offering his personal strategy guide to readers. Jim Yardeni on the Financial Crisis of 2008 Part II: ROUNDING. View Jim Fink’s profile on LinkedIn, the world’s largest professional community. Actionable stock market advice and free investment newsletters: Investing Daily Jim Fink is a lawyer and CFA charterholder who has actively traded in the stock and options markets for more than 20 years. ![]() Personal Finance is KCI Investing’s flagship investment service. By Jim Fink • Decem• Stocks to Watch. Jim Fink is chief investment strategist for Jim Fink’ analyst at Investing Daily’s flagship investing publication, Personal Finance. Fool contributor Jim Fink spent many He has no financial interest in any of the companies mentioned. Investing Daily is a privately held company in financial services with 11- Why oh why would Jim Fink want to pass on all of “his investing secrets” Endgame CEO Nate Fink: Deterrence Failure in Cyber | Mad William Ackman:ġ5 for individual stocks). He sells 25-40 delta put credit spreads at 30-90 days til expiration. These problems are expected to remain a significant aspect of the corporate governance landscape and should be the subject of close attention by policymakers, market participants, and scholars.Jim Fink claims that following the guidelines and information made available to Personal Finance subscribers can result in making an average of $ I have examined the Jim Fink strategy and can assure you it is not sound. The policy measures we put forward, and the beneficial role of hedge fund activism, can partly but not fully address the incentive problems that we analyze and document. We also discuss how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism. Finally, we put forward a set of reforms that policymakers should consider in order to address the incentives of index fund managers to underinvest in stewardship, their incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers, and the continuing rise of index investing. We show that this body of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive problems that our agency-costs framework identifies. We also empirically investigate five ways in which the Big Three could fail to undertake adequate stewardship: the limited attention they pay to financial underperformance their lack of involvement in the selection of directors and lack of attention to important director characteristics their failure to take actions that would bring about governance changes that are desirable according to their own governance principles their decision to stay on the sidelines regarding corporate governance reforms and their avoidance of involvement in consequential securities litigation. We then provide an empirical analysis of the full range of stewardship activities that index funds do and do not undertake, focusing on the three largest index fund managers, which we collectively refer to as the “Big Three.” We analyze four dimensions of the Big Three’s stewardship activities: the limited personnel time they devote to stewardship regarding most of their portfolio companies the small minority of portfolio companies with which they have any private communications their focus on divergences from governance principles and their limited attention to other issues that could be significant for their investors and their pro-management voting patterns. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers. Stewardship decisions by index funds depend not just on the interests of index fund investors but also on the incentives of index fund managers. We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers-how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies-can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. ![]() Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. ![]()
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